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Abstract
The recently introduced weak consistency notions of 2-coherence and
2-convexity are endowed with a concept of 2-coherent, respectively, 2-
convex natural extension, whose properties parallel those of the natural
extension for coherent lower previsions. We show that some of these ex-
tensions coincide in various common instances, thus producing the same
inferences.
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1
1 Introduction
In a recent paper [4] we introduced two weak consistency concepts for conditional
lower previsions, 2-convexity and 2-coherence, studying their basic properties in
greater detail in [5]. Formally, 2-coherent and 2-convex conditional lower pre-
visions are a broad generalisation of the 2-coherent (unconditional) lower pre-
visions in [6, Appendix B]. Our main aim in introducing them was to explore
the flexibility of the betting scheme which underlies these and other consistency
concepts (starting with de Finetti’s subjective probability [1]), showing the ca-
pability of these previsions of encompassing a number of different uncertainty
models in a unified framework.
An important issue is also to detect which properties from stronger con-
sistency concepts are somehow retained by either 2-convexity or 2-coherence.
As shown in [4, 5], a very relevant feature of theirs is that they are endowed
with, respectively, a 2-convex and a 2-coherent natural extension. The prop-
erties of these extensions, exemplified in Proposition 1, are formally perfectly
analogous to those of the natural extension for coherent lower previsions (follow-
ing Williams’ coherence in the conditional framework [7]) or the convex natural
extension for convex conditional previsions [2]. In particular, when finite, they
allow extending a lower prevision P from its domain D to any larger D′ ⊃ D.
Yet, when different natural extensions can be applied to the same P , the re-
sults may differ also considerably (cf. the later Example 1 in Section 3). Since
2-coherence is weaker than coherence, inferences produced by the 2-coherent
natural extension will be generally vaguer than those guaranteed by the co-
herent natural extension, and similarly with other instances. Actually, often
2-coherent or 2-convex natural extensions will be even too vague. This points
out a drawback of these weak consistency notions and is one reason why, in
our view, they should not be regarded as realistic candidates for replacing co-
herence or convexity. Rather, we will show in this paper that they may be
helpful precisely for determining the coherent natural extension, or the convex
natural extension. In fact, after concisely presenting the necessary preliminary
notions in Section 2, we show in Section 3 that there are significant instances
where some or all of the four extensions we mentioned so far coincide. For this,
the lower prevision P is initially defined on a structured set X|B∅ (cf. Defini-
tion 2) of conditional gambles, representing a generalisation of a vector space
to a conditional environment. Hence we are considering a special, but rather
common, situation. In Proposition 2 we give an alternative expression for the
coherent natural extension, which is later needed and generalises a result in
[6] (cf. Corollary 1). After showing how to ensure finiteness for the relevant
natural extensions, Theorems 2, 3 and 4 present instances where more different
extensions coincide. These results are discussed in the comment after Theorem
4 and in the concluding Section 4. Due to space constraints, some of the proofs
are omitted.
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2 Preliminaries
LetD be an arbitrary set of conditional gambles, that is, the generic element ofD
is X|B, with X a gamble (a bounded random variable), and B non-impossible
event. A conditional lower prevision P : D → R is a real map which, be-
haviourally, determines the supremum buying price P (X|B) of any X|B ∈ D.
This means that an agent should be willing to buy, or to bet in favour of, X|B,
for any price lower than P (X|B). The agent’s gain from the transaction/bet
on X|B for P (X|B) is IB(X − P (X|B)). Here IB is the indicator of event B.
Its role is that of ensuring that the purchased bet is called off and the money
returned to the agent iff B does not occur. In the sequel, we shall use the symbol
B for both event B and its indicator IB .
A generic consistency requirement for P asks that no finite linear combina-
tion of bets on elements of D, with prices given by P , should produce a loss
(bounded away from 0) for the agent. We obtain different known concepts by
imposing constraints on the number of terms in the linear combination or on
their coefficients si:
Definition 1. Let P : D → R be a given conditional lower prevision.
a) P is a coherent conditional lower prevision on D iff, for all m ∈ N0,
∀X0|B0, . . . , Xm|Bm ∈ D, ∀s0, . . . , sm ≥ 0, defining S(s) =
∨{Bi :
si 6= 0, i = 0, . . . ,m} and G =
∑m
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) − s0B0(X0 −
P (X0|B0)), it holds, whenever S(s) 6= ∅, that sup{G|S(s)} ≥ 0.
b) P is 2-coherent on D iff a) holds with m = 1 (hence there are two terms
in G).
c) P is convex on D iff a) holds with the additional convexity constraint∑m
i=1 si = s0 = 1.
d) P is 2-convex on D iff c) holds with m = 1, i.e., iff, ∀X0|B0, X1|B1 ∈ D,
we have that, defining G2c = B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))−B0(X0 − P (X0|B0)),
sup(G2c|B0 ∨B1) ≥ 0.
e) P is centered, convex or 2-convex, on D iff it is convex or 2-convex,
respectively, and ∀X|B ∈ D, we have that 0|B ∈ D and P (0|B) = 0.
Condition a), which is Williams’ coherence [7] in the structure-free version of
[3], is clearly the strongest one. Convexity is a relaxation of coherence, studied
in [2]. Given P on D, the following relationships hold:
P coherent⇒ P 2-coherent⇒ P 2-convex
P coherent⇒ P convex⇒ P 2-convex. (1)
The consistency concepts recalled so far can be characterised by means of axioms
on the special sets X|B∅ defined next:
Definition 2. Let X be a linear space of gambles and B ⊂ X a set of (indicators
of) events, such that Ω ∈ B and BX ∈ X ,∀B ∈ B,∀X ∈ X . Setting B∅ =
B − {∅}, define X|B∅ = {X|B : X ∈ X , B ∈ B∅}.
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Theorem 1 (Characterisation Theorems). Let P : X|B∅ → R be a conditional
lower prevision.
a) P is coherent on X|B∅ if and only if [3, 7]
(A1) P (X|B)− P (Y |B) ≤ sup{X − Y |B}, ∀X|B, Y |B ∈ X |B∅.
(A2) P (λX|B) = λP (X|B),∀X|B ∈ X |B∅,∀λ ≥ 0.
(A3) P (X + Y |B) ≥ P (X|B) + P (Y |B), ∀X|B, Y |B ∈ X |B∅.
(A4) P (A(X−P (X|A∧B))|B) = 0,∀X ∈ X ,∀A,B ∈ B∅ : A∧B 6= ∅.
b) P is 2-coherent on X|B∅ if and only if (A1), (A2), (A4) and the following
axiom hold [5]:
(A5) P (λX|B) ≤ λP (X|B), ∀λ < 0.
c) P is convex on X|B∅ if and only if (A1), (A4) and the following axiom
hold [2, Theorem 8]
(A6) P (λX + (1− λ)Y |B) ≥ λP (X|B) + (1− λ)P (Y |B),∀X|B, Y |B ∈
X |B∅,∀λ ∈]0, 1[.
d) P is 2-convex on X|B∅ if and only if (A1) and (A4) hold [5].
Next we recall the definitions of the various natural extensions studied in
this paper. The term ‘natural extension’, without further qualifications, will
denote the coherent natural extension in Definition 3, a).
Definition 3 (Various natural extensions). Let P : D → R be a conditional
lower prevision, and Z|A a conditional gamble.
a) Define L(Z|A) = {α : sup{∑mi=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) − A(Z − α)|A ∨
S(s)} < 0, for some Xi|Bi ∈ D, si ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}, where S(s) =
∨mi=1{Bi : si 6= 0}. Then, the (coherent) natural extension of P on Z|A
is E(Z|A) = supL(Z|A).
b) Define L2(Z|A) putting m = 1 in L(Z|A). The 2-coherent natural exten-
sion of P on Z|A is E2(Z|A) = supL2(Z|A).
c) Define Lc(Z|A) from L(Z|A), by adding the constraint
∑m
i=1 si = 1 in the
‘for some’ part. The convex natural extension of P on Z|A is Ec(Z|A) =
supLc(Z|A).
d) Define L2c(Z|A) putting m = 1 in Lc(Z|A), i.e. L2c(Z|A) = {α :
sup{B(X −P (X|B))−A(Z −α)|A∨B} < 0, for some X|B ∈ D}. Then,
the 2-convex natural extension E2c of P on Z|A is E2c = supL2c(Z|A).
The properties of these four natural extensions are analogous [2, 3, 5]. Here
we state them for the 2-convex natural extension. For the properties of E, E2,
Ec, replace E2c and ‘2-convex’ with, respectively, E and ‘coherent’, E2 and
‘2-coherent’, Ec and ‘convex’.
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Proposition 1. Let P : D → R a conditional lower prevision, with D ⊂ D∗. If
E2c is finite on D∗, then
a) E2c(Z|A) ≥ P (Z|A), ∀Z|A ∈ D.
b) E2c is 2-convex on D∗.
c) If P ∗ is 2-convex on D∗ and P ∗(Z|A) ≥ P (Z|A), ∀Z|A ∈ D, then
P ∗(Z|A) ≥ E2c(Z|A), ∀Z|A ∈ D∗.
d) P is 2-convex on D if and only if E2c = P on D.
e) If P is 2-convex on D, then E2c is its smallest 2-convex extension on D∗.
3 When do different natural extensions coin-
cide?
Given a lower prevision P on D, its natural extensions E, E2, Ec, E2c will
generally be different, and ordered (when finite) as follows.
Lemma 1. Given P : D → R, it holds that
E ≥ E2 ≥ E2c
E ≥ Ec ≥ E2c. (2)
Proof. It is easy to realise that (2) holds recalling (1), Definition 3 and Propo-
sition 1. For instance, Ec ≥ E2c because Ec, being convex (Proposition 1, b)),
is also 2-convex (cf. (1)), but then Ec ≥ E2c by Proposition 1, e).
It may also be the case that some among E, E2, Ec, E2c are infinite. But
even when being finite, they may differ considerably, as illustrated by the next
simple example.
Example 1. Let D = {X}, where X may only take the values 0 and 1. Assign
P (X) ∈ (0, 1), which is clearly coherent, hence 2-convex, on D. Its natural
extension E on {2X} is E(2X) = 2P (X) by (A2), because E is coherent on
{X, 2X} and coincides with P on X. However, E2c(2X) ≥ P (X) by (A1) and
E2c(2X) = P (X) < E(2X) is 2-convex. This can be checked directly using
Definition 1, d). (There are only two gains G2c to inspect.)
On our way to establish when more natural extensions may coincide, we pre-
liminarily tackle two issues: derive an alternative expression for the (coherent)
natural extension, and discuss how to hedge possibly non-finite extensions. We
assume throughout that the lower prevision P is initially assessed on some set
X|B∅. As for the former issue, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. Let P be coherent on X|B∅. Then, defining
L1(Z|A) = {α : sup{BX −A(Z − α)|A ∨B} < 0,
for some X ∈ X , B ∈ B, with P (X|B) = 0 if B 6= ∅}, (3)
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L1(Z|A) = L(Z|A) and the natural extension of P on Z|A is
E(Z|A) = supL1(Z|A). (4)
Proof. We prove that L1(Z|A) = L(Z|A), with L1(Z|A) defined in (3), L(Z|A)
in Definition 3 a); taking their suprema gives then the thesis.
i) L1(Z|A) ⊂ L(Z|A).
In fact, let α ∈ L1(Z|A). Then sup{BX−A(Z−α)|A∨B} < 0. If B = ∅,
then BX = 0, A ∨ B = A in the supremum argument, and α ∈ L(Z|A)
(case S(s) = ∅). If B 6= ∅, then P (X|B) = 0 and writing the supremum
as sup{B(X − P (X|B)) − A(Z − α)|A ∨ B} < 0 it appears that again
α ∈ L(Z|A).
ii) L(Z|A) ⊂ L1(Z|A).
Let now α ∈ L(Z|A) and, referring to the definition of L(Z|A), W =∑m
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))−A(Z − α).
If S(s) = ∅, then sup{−A(Z−α)|A} < 0 ensures that α ∈ L1(Z|A) (case
B = ∅).
If S(s) 6= ∅, since P is coherent on X|B∅, we may apply (A2), (A3) and
(A4) in Theorem 1 a) to get
P (
∑
i:si 6=0 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(s)) ≥∑
i:si 6=0 siP (Bi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(s)) = 0.
(5)
Define Y =
∑
i:si 6=0 siBi(Xi−P (Xi|Bi)). Since P (Y |S(s)) ≥ 0 by (5), we
obtain
S(s)[Y − P (Y |S(s))]−A(Z − α) ≤ Y −A(Z − α) = W
and hence
sup{S(s)[Y − P (Y |S(s))]−A(Z − α)|A ∨ S(s)} ≤
sup{W |A ∨ S(s)} < 0. (6)
Now put S(s) = B, Y − P (Y |B) = X, and note that P (X|B) = P (Y −
P (Y |B)|B) = P (Y |B)−P (Y |B) = 0, recalling P (Y −c|B) = P (Y |B)−c,
a necessary condition for coherence, at the second equality. Hence (6) may
be rewritten as
sup{BX −A(Z − α)|A ∨B} < 0,
which proves that α ∈ L1(Z|A).
While (4) supplies a new alternative expression for E(Z|A), it is interest-
ing to observe that it boils down to a known result in the unconditional case,
formally obtained putting B = {Ω,∅}, A = Ω in Proposition 2.
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Corollary 1. If P is coherent on a linear space X , then
E(Z) = sup{P (X) : X ≤ Z,X ∈ X}. (7)
In fact, Corollary 1 is part of the statement of Corollary 3.1.8 in [6].
Turning to the second issue, we are interested in guaranteeing that the vari-
ous natural extensions considered are finite, i.e. neither−∞ nor +∞. Regarding
E (or E2), its finiteness is ensured if the lower prevision P to be extended is
coherent (or 2-coherent) [3, 5]. In the case of Ec or E2c, a sufficient condition
[5] is that P (0|A) = 0, for any additional Z|A we wish to extend P to. While
this condition is generally not necessary, it is nonetheless rather natural, but a
2-convex or convex P does not necessarily fulfil it. In fact, it may be the case
that 0|A ∈ X |B∅ and P (0|A) 6= 0, which we can avoid by restricting our atten-
tion to centered 2-convex or convex previsions. But even doing so, as we will, it
may happen that 0|A /∈ X |B∅ and, unlike the case of a coherent or 2-coherent
P , P (0|A) = 0 is not the unique (2-)convex extension of P . However, it holds
that [2, 5]:
Proposition 3. Let P be centered 2-convex (alternatively, centered convex) on
X|B∅. Given 0|A /∈ X |B∅, the extension of P such that P (0|A) = 0 is 2-convex
(convex).
Proposition 3 suggests that when extending a centered P from X|B∅ to
D∗ ⊃ X|B∅ we could consider first extending it to the set
(X|B∅)+ = X|B∅ ∪ {0|A : Z|A ∈ D∗}, (8)
putting P (0|A) = 0. Adding zeroes is harmless when considering the natural
extension, in the sense of the following
Lemma 2. Assign P on X|B∅ and let D∗ ⊃ X|B∅. Using the notation L(Z|A)
for the set L in Definition 3 a) when D there is replaced by X|B∅, we write
L+(Z|A) instead when D = (X|B∅)+. Then L(Z|A) = L+(Z|A), and conse-
quently E(Z|A) = supL(Z|A) = supL+(Z|A),∀Z|A ∈ D∗.
Definition 4. Given X|B∅ ⊂ D∗, let P be defined on X|B∅, and on (X|B∅)+
putting P (0|A) = 0,∀0|A ∈ (X|B∅)+. Then, E+c , E+2c are the convex, respec-
tively 2-convex natural extension of P from (X|B∅)+ to D∗.
Theorem 2. Let P be coherent on X|B∅(⊂ D∗). Then, E(Z|A) = E+2c(Z|A),
∀Z|A ∈ D∗.
Proof. By Definitions 3 d) and 4, E+2c(Z|A) = supL+2c(Z|A), where
L+2c(Z|A) = {α : sup{B(X − P (X|B))−A(Z − α)|A ∨B} < 0,
for some X|B ∈ (X|B∅)+}.
We show that L+2c(Z|A) = L(Z|A).
In fact, if α ∈ L+2c(Z|A), then clearly α ∈ L+(Z|A), hence α ∈ L(Z|A),
because L+(Z|A) = L(Z|A) by Lemma 2.
Conversely, let α ∈ L(Z|A) = L1(Z|A), by Proposition 2. Then, recalling
(3), two distinct situations may occur:
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a) sup{BX−A(Z−α)|A∨B} < 0, X ∈ X , B ∈ B∅, P (X|B) = 0. Rewriting
the supremum as sup{B(X−P (X|B))−A(Z−α)|A∨B} < 0, then clearly
α ∈ L+2c(Z|A).
b) sup{−A(Z − α)|A} < 0. Since 0|A ∈ (X|B∅)+, the supremum may be
also written as sup{A(0 − P (0|A)) − A(Z − α)|A} < 0, from which it is
patent that α ∈ L+2c(Z|A).
Therefore, L+2c(Z|A) = L(Z|A). The thesis follows taking the suprema.
Theorem 2 assures that the natural extension and the 2-convex natural ex-
tension coincide, if P is coherent on X|B∅. Hence the 2-coherent natural ex-
tension E2 coincides with the former ones too, being sandwiched between them
by Lemma 1.
Another result of the same kind is
Theorem 3. Let P be centered convex on (X|B∅)+. Then, it is E+c (Z|B) =
E+2c(Z|A), ∀Z|A ∈ D∗.
Finally, we can now establish the sandwich theorem:
Theorem 4 (Sandwich Theorem). Let P be coherent on X|B∅. Then E(Z|A) =
E2(Z|A) = Ec(Z|A) = E2c(Z|A),∀Z|A ∈ D∗.
Comment The Sandwich Theorem ensures that the simpler 2-convex nat-
ural extension may be enough to compute the natural extension, or the convex
natural extension, in the special case that the starting set is X|B∅. This seems
to suggest that if P is initially assessed on a structured enough set and already
coherent there, only the rather weak properties of (centered) 2-convexity really
matter and need to be checked when looking for a least-committal coherent
extension.
4 Conclusions
The results of the previous section show that the weak consistency notion of
2-convexity may be helpful in the important inferential problem of extending
coherent or convex conditional (and unconditional) lower previsions. There
remains to explore how this could be exploited in operational procedures, and
whether the results can be applied to more general sets of conditional gambles
than those in Definition 2. In our opinion, however, the present results already
supply an additional motivation for further studying the interesting notion of
2-convexity.
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